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Recent Developments

Imbesi v. Carpenter Realty Corp.
Maryland's Non-Claim Statute Does Not Permit a Creditor Setoff once All
Creditor Claims Are Barred by Statute
By Brian Kelly

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that section
8-103 of the Wills and Trusts Article
of the Annotated Code of Maryland,
which limits the time a creditor has to
present a claim, does not permit a
setoff based upon a creditor's claim
against the Estate once presentment
of creditor's claims are barred by
statutory limitations. Imbesi v.
Carpenter Realty Corp., 357 Md.
375, 744 A.2d 549 (2000). The
court found that permitting a creditor
to setoff a claim, which was not
presented in the allotted six month
time period pursuant to section 8103 (c), from monies owed to the
Estate, would directly conflict with the
purpose of the statute. The court
refused to view the defensive use of
setoff as an exception from the
Maryland nonclaim statute of section
8-103, thereby prohibiting any
assertion of creditor's claim on an
estate after the applicable six-month
period expired.
On June 1, 1982, Mr. Imbesi
entered into a stock redemption
agreement between 7-UP of
Baltimore, 7-UP of Philadelphia, and
the Carpenter Realty Corporation
("CRC"), whereby he would sell all
the stock he owned in the companies
to the issuing corporations for
$500,000 payable in 120 monthly
installments. In 1979, Mr. Imbesi
issued an $80,000 promissory note

30.2 U. Bait L.F. 76

to 7-UP of Philadelphia, due October
23,1989. The promissory note was
never repaid. Upon the death of Mr.
Imbesi in 1992, the personal
representative of the Estate, filed
Letters of Administration with the
Baltimore County Register of Wills.
In addition to these Letters, notice,
pursuant to section 8-103(a)(1), was
sent to creditors informing them of
Mr. Imbesi's death.
Following the notice to creditors,
the Estate sued CRC and 7-UP of
Baltimore in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County for the respective
overdue balances of the stock
redemption agreement owed to Mr.
Imbesi. CRC counterclaimed,
contending that the claims on the stock
redemption agreement may be offset
by the amount on the $80,000.00 note
originally possessed by 7-UP of
Philadelphia, but negotiated for value
to CRC. The circuit court disagreed,
and found in favor of the Estate for
$57,447.67. The Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland, questioning the
authenticity of the 1979 note, reversed
and remanded the case. On remand,
the circuit court found that the 1979
note could be used by CRC as a setoff
against the Estate's claims, and held
that a defensive use of setoff does not
violate the legislative intent ofsection
8-103. The court of special appeals
affirmed the trial court's interpretation
of section 8-103(a), which denied the

creditors from presenting the note,
but pelmitted CRC to offs~t the value
of the note from the debts owed to
the Estate. Following the ruling, the
court of appeals granted certiorari.
In determining whether the right
to setoff a claim is a type of claim
barred by section 8-103, the court
of appeals began its analysis by
comparing the impact setoffwould
have as compared to a counterclaim
and recoupment. Imbesi, 357 Md.
at 380,744 A.2d at 552. Setoff, by
definition, is "a diminution or a
complete counterbalancing of the
adversary's claim based upon
circumstances arising out of a
transaction other than that on which
the adversary's claim is based." Id
at 380, 744 A.2d at 552 (citing
Billman v. State of Maryland
Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md.
App. 79, 92-93, 593 A.2d 684
(1991 )). In the instant case, CRC
argued that the only feasible remedy
available to creditors is the right to
setoff. Due to the presentment ofthe
claim after the statutory period of
section 8-1 03(c), the creditor argued
that since the transaction failed to
occur in the same transaction or
occurrence as the prior business
dealing, all claims of recoupment
would be barred. Id. CRC
contended, and the court of special
appeals agreed, that use of the note
to setoff the amount owed to the

Recent Developments
Estate is a purely defensive tactic, and
should be permitted in order to offset
the monies owed to the estate via the
stock redemption agreement. ld. at
382, 744 A.2d at 552.
The court of appeals squarely
rejected the court of special appeals's
argument, as well as CRC's, that
setoff does not affect the timely and
efficient process that section 8-103
was drafted to protect. ld. at 382,
744 A.2d at 553. The general
purpose of section 8-103, the court
held, is to provide notice to all
creditors of the Estate so they may
file their claims in the applicable time
period, thereby allowing probate to
progress in an expedient manner. ld.
Following this interpretation, the court
found that a setoff defense would
require consideration of the facts and
circumstances of a separate
transaction. ld.
The court further noted that the
legislative history of the statute
illustrated a policy of increasing the
scope of protection by the non-claim
statute. ld. at 383, 744 A.2d at 553.
The authority given to the non-claim
statute was reinforced by the judicial
history of the statute, which illustrated
the increase, not dimunition, ofpower
the judiciary has interpreted in the
statute over the years. ld. at 382-86,
744 A.2d at 553-55. Furthermore,
the intent of the language and history
of the statute was to "forever bar"
claims that were not brought within the
applicable time period set forth in the
statute. ld. at 386,744 A.2d at 554.
The court, however, was careful
to state that the non-claim statute does
not bar all claims in all circumstances.
In Chandlee v. Stockley, the court,

"held that the personal representative
was estopped to assert the bar of the
statute because of representations
made on behalf of the estate that the
injured plaintiff s claim would be
paid." ld. at 385, 744 A.2d at 554
(quoting Chandlee v. Stockley, 219
Md. 493, 150 A.2d 438 (1959)).
However, upon comparison to
Jmbesi, CRC was never informed of
the possibility of payment on their
claim, but instead was consistently
refused recognition of a valid claim
due to CRC's failure to present the
note to the Estate within the statutory
period. ld. at 386, 744 A.2d at 555.
Finally, the court of appeals
analyzed the practices of other
jurisdictions regarding the parameters
of the non-claim statute. ld. at 389,
744 A.2d at 557. In Berrigan v.
Pearsall, the Connecticut court found
that the non-claim statute was no more
than a statute oflimitations which did
not prohibit the defensive use of a
claim of setoff. ld. at 389,744 A.2d
at 557 (citing Berrigan v. Pearsall,
46 Conn. 274 (1878)). The Court
of Appeals of Maryland, however,
opposed this view, stating, "we
construe § 8-103(a) to bar a claim
that has not been presented and that
arises out of a transaction separate
from the one which the estate claims."
ld. at391, 744 A.2d at 558.
Based on the foregoing legal
analysis, the court concluded that the
creditor in question could not assert
a claim that was barred by limitations
against a note owed to the Estate, due
to section 8-103(c). Jd. at 392, 744
A.2d at 558. The court found the
non-claim statute not to be a statute
oflimitations, but instead "a condition

precedent to a legal recovery against
a solvent estate." ld. at 391, 744
A.2d at 557.
The court's holding leaves open
the question of asserting a right of
recoupment in instances where the
same transaction is in question. In this
instance, however, the court decided
to create a clear limitations period.
This bright line rule not only broadens
the scope ofthe non-claim statute, but
also ensures that probate will move
along as expediently as possible,
thereby underscoring the overall
purpose of section 8-103.
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